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“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful
tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor
less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words
mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty
Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.”
~Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass2

Abstract
Human beings intrinsically seek meaning. We readily accept
and absorb a proposition or even a legal stipulation, if it is
meaningful. This human trait coupled with law’s ability to create,
select and infuse meaning ensures that in case of conflict between
rights, those rights that are perceived to be ‘more meaningful’
triumph over those that are viewed to be less so. Hence, it is
important to study the relationship between meaning and law and
its impact on rights and identity of an individual. In order to do so,
we need to address the following questions: What is the meaning
1. Some of the most distinguished philosophers have expounded different
facets of law and added to the understanding of Herbert Lionel Adolphus
Hart’s THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994), Joseph Raz’s THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW (2d ed. 2009), and Jacques Derrida’s “Force of Law: The “Mystical
Foundation of Authority,”’ in ACTS OF RELIGION 230 (Gil Anidjar ed., 2002). I
use the term ‘The Meaning of Law’ not to expound about law’s meaning, but in
a proprietary sense, in the sense of indicating law as a source or an origin of
meaning; the reader for her convenience may refer to the title as “Meaning as
Per Law” or “Meaning Because of Law.”

Lawyer practicing in the Supreme Court of India and a visiting faculty at
Indian Institute of Management, Rohtak and Indian Institute of Management,
Shillong. I am grateful to Professor Menachem Mautner, Professor Petros
Mavroidis, my friends: Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Wouter Schmit JongbloedJSD candidate Columbia Law School, and my wife Nidhi for their incisive
comments on previous drafts of this paper. I am also indebted to my students
at IIM Shillong, who during the course of a discussion on the topic provided
several valuable inputs.
2. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING G LASS 113 (Project Gutenberg
2016) (1898).
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of meaning? How is it constructed? How is one meaning adopted to
the exclusion of all others? What is the role played by law in
construction and adoption of meaning? What is the effect of a
grant of legal sanction to a particular meaning? Why does this
meaning remain unchallenged? Does the role of law in creation of
meaning change depending upon the right in question? I address
these questions on the basis of three strands of classical theory of
meaning, constitutional jurisprudence, and a few landmark cases
that I have had the privilege to be part of. This paper begins by
exploring the meaning of meaning and then examines a few
models to better understand the role played by law in construction
of meaning. I then study the conflict between the plurality of
meaning of the public interest and the singularity of meaning of
individual rights and the resultant effect on the identity of an
individual. The paper’s final assertion lies in envisaging scenarios
where the singularity of meaning of individual rights can triumph
over the plurality of meaning of the public interest.

I.

I NTRODUCTION

When St. Augustine spoke about time, he could very well
have been referring to meaning. 3 Meaning, like time, is easier to
know than to explain. My endeavor in this paper is to try and
understand how law influences construction and adoption of
meaning and why we accept that interpretation. The conventional
approach in this regard has been to address the question from the
point of view of law rather than of meaning itself. 4 The answer to
the query of how law shapes meaning and why we accept that
meaning can be understood in terms of either authority of law,
force of law, or legitimacy of law. In my opinion, this approach
overlooks the importance of meaning in our lives, which from an
existential and survival perspective is perhaps as important, if not
more important, than law. 5
3. “What then is time? If no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to
one that asketh, I know not . . . .” SAINT AUGUSTINE , Book XI, in THE
CONFESSIONS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE 118, 123 (E.B. Pusey trans.).
4. Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its
Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI . L. REV . 1235
(2015).
5. Viktor Frankl while narrating how he survived the harrowing conditions
of a concentration camp writes,
“What was really needed was a fundamental change in our attitude
toward life. We had to learn ourselves and, furthermore, we had to
teach the despairing men, that it did not really matter what we
expected from life, but rather what life expected from us. We needed to
stop asking about the meaning of life, and instead to think of ourselves
as those who were being questioned by life —daily and hourly. Our
answer must consist, not in talk and meditation, but in right action and
in right conduct. Life ultimately means taking the responsibility to find
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In order to avoid this error, I begin this paper by addressing
the importance and meaning of “meaning” in the first part,
wherein I examine some of the classical theories of meaning. In
the second part, I develop certain models for understanding the
role played by law in transformation of meaning to definition. In
this part, I also study the ability of law to infuse meaning in
otherwise seemingly random human conduct. Having established
the background to study the impact of legally selected meaning on
rights, I analyze the conflict between the singularity of meaning of
individual rights and the plurality of meaning of public interest,
and its implications on individual identity in the third part. I
contend that given to our innate need to be guided by meaning, the
rights that are perceived to be ‘more meaningful’ triumph over
those viewed as less so. This analysis is undertaken with the aid of
constitutional jurisprudence and some significant cases that I had
the privilege to be part of. The paper finds its just conclusion in
the fourth and the last part by proposing alternate modes of
interpretation whereby the singularity of meaning of individual
rights can triumph over the plurality of meaning of the public
interest.

II. THE MEANING OF “MEANING”
Human beings are intrinsically meaning seeking beings. 6 This
thought is echoed by Viktor E. Frankl who, while writing about his
harrowing experiences in a concentration camp, approvingly
quotes Nietzsche in stating, “He who has a why to live for can bear
with almost any how.”7 In the relationship between law and

the right answer to its problems and to fulfill the tasks which it
constantly sets for each individual.
These tasks, and therefore the meaning of life, differ from man to man,
and from moment to moment. Thus it is impossible to define the
meaning of life in a general way. Questions about the meaning of life
can never be answered by sweeping statements. "Life" does not mean
something vague, but something very real and concrete, just as life's
tasks are also very real and concrete. They form man's destiny, which is
different and unique for each individual. No man and no destiny can be
compared with any other man or any other destiny. No situation
repeats itself, and each situation calls for a different response.
Sometimes the situation in which a man finds himself may require him
to shape his own fate by action. At other times it is more advantageous
for him to make use of an opportunity for contemplation and to realize
assets in this way. Sometimes man may be required simply to accept
fate, to bear his cross.”
VIKTOR E. FRANKL, MAN’S SEARCH FOR MEANING 85 (2008).
6. Menachem Mautner, Meaning, Religion, and the State: On the Future of
Liberal Human Rights, 10 L. & ETHICS HUM . RTS . 109, 110 (2016).
7. VIKTOR E. FRANKL, MAN’S SEARCH FOR MEANING 84 (2008). See also
SUSAN WOLF, MEANING IN LIFE AND WHY IT MATTERS 7-8 (2010) (stating,
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meaning, if we give primacy to understanding meaning we begin
to better appreciate law’s ability and limitations in the
construction of meaning.
With our sails set to the aforesaid course, let us turn our focus
towards the urge to understand, to find meaning, and to explain,
which perhaps is one of the most fundamental human urges. What
drives this urge? Is it the need to communicate? Is it the need to
mean the same thing in the same sense?8 Why must we agree on a
meaning? Can a meaning exist without agreement? These
questions of fundamental importance can be addressed from
various perspectives- linguistic, social, economic…so on and so
forth. For the purposes of this paper, I am limiting my inquiry to
the legal contours of meaning.
One way of understanding meaning is that it is a product of
the intrinsic characteristic of an object or phenomenon. 9 This
functional approach to meaning however cannot succeed when we
are dealing with rights. Rights are perpetually in conflict with
each other. 10 Which right shall prevail over another, more often
than not, is not a subject matter of its functionality, but of
interpretation. Before we dwell further on the relationship
between law and meaning, it is important to examine some of the
existing theories of meaning.
C.K Ogden and I.A. Richards in their seminal work on
meaning propose that, “[w]ords, as everyone now knows, ‘mean’
nothing by themselves. . . . It is only when a thinker makes use of
them that they stand for anything, or in one sense have
‘meaning’.”11 Two attributes of meaning stand out from the above

“[p]eople sometimes complain that their lives lack meaning; they yearn for
meaning; they seek meaning. People sometimes judge others to be leading
exceptionally meaningful lives, looking upon them with envy or admir ation.
Meaning is commonly associated with a kind of depth. Often the need for
meaning is connected to the sense that one’s life is empty or shallow. . . . When
the word ‘meaningful’ is used in characterizing a life (or in characterizing
what is missing from a life), it calls something to mind, but it is not clear what,
nor is it clear that it calls or is meant to call the same thing to mind in all
contexts.”).
8. This semantic need is statutorily recognized in the definition of consent
under The Indian Contract Act, 1872, § 13 (Eng.). The definition of “consent”
under the Act states, “[t]wo or more person[s] are said to consent when they
agree upon the same thing in the same sense.” Id. Put differently, the process
of construction of meaning is essentially an exercise in manufacturing consent.
As elaborated in the ensuing paragraphs, meaning cannot exist without a
referent. Consent in a mercantile sense means offer and acceptance; I propose
that, in a semantical sense, law provides the hegemonic justificatio n for
acceptance of one particular form of meaning to the exclusion of all others.
9. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 7, 9, 158
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958).
10. Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, 99 ETHICS 503 (1989).
11. C.K. O GDEN & I.A. RICHARDS , THE MEANING OF MEANING 9-10 (8th ed.
1946).
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statement: 1) meaning is relative; and 2) that meaning is capable
of construction.
Before the work of Drs. Ogden and Richards, the prevailing
view was that for every word, there is a single, correct meaning
associated with it. Drs. Ogden and Richards offered an alternative
perspective in form of theory of “Proper Meaning Superstition,”
“which states that there is not a single ‘correct’ meaning
associated with each and every word because each word means
something different to each person, or more simply, meanings
don’t reside in words, they reside in people.” 12
On the other hand, Professor Mautner argues, while
analyzing the interrelationship between religion and secularism
from the perspective of meaning, that the concept of meaning itself
has many meanings. 13 These systems of meaning are shaped by
the interaction of our mind categories with the external world, and
law plays an important role in creation of these mind categories
and consequently the embedding of meaning. If one were to
synthesize Prof. Mautner’s hypothesis of mind categories with
Ogden’s proposition of assigned meaning, then law emerges as a
primal force shaping the creation, internalization, and acceptance
of meaning.

III. FROM MEANING TO DEFINITION
The transition from meaning to definition is one from
ambiguity to clarity. As per Ogden and Richards, when a person
speaks, the words he or she chooses mean different things to
different people. One may agree that a term best suited to describe
this condition is ambiguity. 14 According to Ogden and Richards,
the best way to solve the ambiguity problem is to provide a
definition of various terms or concepts. 15 As elaborated in the
ensuing paragraphs, law plays a pivotal role in removal of this
ambiguity, thus paving the way for the transition from meaning to
definition.
In Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein explores
the distinction between meaning and definition. 16 As per
Wittgenstein, in each case, the meaning of a word presupposes our
ability to use it. 17 This was elaborated with Wittgenstein’s now
famous thought experiment asking the reader to come up with the

12. A. Bosco, What Do You Mean: A Brief Look at Ogden and Richards’
Theory of Meaning, CAL. ST. U. FRESNO (2002), http://zimmer.csufre
sno.edu/~johnca/spch100/4-1-ogden.htm.
13. Mautner, supra note 6, at 110.
14. Bosco, supra note 12.
15. Ogden & Richards, supra note 11, at 91.
16. See generally Wittgenstein, supra note 9.
17. Id. at 18.
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definition of the word “game.”18 Wittgenstein goes on to
demonstrate that, while it is possible to come up with a definition
of the word “game,” each attempt at defining game leaves out or
adds one or more relevant features of the game that are
contextual, such as amusement, competition, and rules. 19
According to Wittgenstein, we do not need a definition of “game”
because everybody understands what we mean when we talk
about playing a game, and we can clearly identify and correct
inaccurate uses of the word, all without reference to any definition
that consists of necessary and sufficient conditions for the
application of the concept of a game. 20 Wittgenstein posits that
definitions emerge from “forms of life,” which are roughly the
culture and society in which they are used. 21 He further rejects the
idea that ostensive definitions can provide us with the meaning of
a word. 22 According to Wittgenstein, the thing that the word
stands for does not give the word meaning. 23 The understanding of
an ostensive definition, in fact, presupposes an understanding of
the way the word being defined is used. 24
In my opinion, meaning can be a product of the intrinsic
characteristic of the right or object, but from a legal standpoint,
definition can be best understood as the selected meaning, as
understood or adopted by law. I now propose two frameworks
which can help us better understand the relationship between
meaning, definition, and law.
First, consider the following analogy of why objects appear to
be of a particular color. It is well understood that objects appear to
be the color that they reflect after absorbing colors of all other
wavelengths (See Figure 1). 25 In my view, this process of
absorption and reflection plays out in the case of meaning and law
as well (See Figure 2). In the case of any dispute involving
interpretation of rights, law absorbs all the meanings which are to
be rejected, based on the then existing social and cultural context,
18. Id. at 3, 31, 32, 36.
19. FREDERICK SHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 38 (2015)
20. Wittgenstein, supra note 9, at 66
21. Id. at 94; Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Wittgenstein on Forms of Life,
Patterns of Life and Ways of Living, Nordic Wittgenstein Review , SPECIAL
ISSUE 28 (2015); Abdolrahim Fatemi et al, The Later Wittgenstein, Forms of
Life and Religious Belief, INT’L RES . J. APPLIED & BASIC SCI . Vol.3 2870
(2012),
Vol.1,
37
(2012).
www.irjabs.com/files_site/paperlist/r_601_12
1231163056.pdf.
22. Wittgenstein, supra note 9, at 7, 8 ,17, 18
23. Id. at 31
24. Id. at 19.
25. See What is color? Why are things the color that they are?, U. CAL.
SANTA BARBRA SCIENCELINE , http://scienceline.ucsb.edu/getkey.php? key=2
207 (last visited Sept. 24, 2016); see also Why do objects emit only particular
colors?,
DEP’T.
PHYSICS
U.
ILL.
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN,
http://van.physics.illinois.edu/qa/listing.php?id=41968 (last visited on Apr. 21,
2016).
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and allows only the definition to be reflected back on to the society.
This is not to disregard the role played by political, economic,
social, and religious forces in the construction of meaning. I
presume that role at the stage of absorption. It is my contention
that the final process of selecting a particular meaning,
interpretation, or definition is a function of law. No other
phenomenon can help legitimize the exclusion of all other possible
meanings.
FIGURE 1
Different wavelengths

Red color
Object

FIGURE 2
Various meanings

Definition
Law

Consider the common social phenomenon of an exclusive club,
which prominently displays on its door, “Right of admission is
reserved.” This helps the club restrict the entry of non-members
and to cater its facilities exclusively for the benefits of its
members. Now this restriction on entry exists because of social or
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economic reasons, but is enforced because of legal ones. The
legitimacy of law ensures that non-members respect the private
right to property. This is not purely a function of force of law. The
exclusivity is maintained because law absorbs or eliminates all
other possible interpretations of the words, “Right of admission
reserved” and leaves the one that we understand as deferential to
private right to property.
Similarly, consider the case of a contract for sale of an
apartment. The intentions of the parties as recognized and
enforced by law excludes all other possible meanings and selects a
particular definition of apartment, which will include its physical
description, dimensions, and location. The act of defining is an act
of eliminating alternatives. This act of elimination, which would
otherwise never be accepted, by individuals and society at large, is
made acceptable by law.
My second attempt at understanding the relationship
between meaning, law, and definition is based upon the Ogden
triangle. 26 Drs. Ogden and Richards in their book, T he Meaning
Of Meaning, first proposed a relationship between thought,
symbol, and referent that has come to be known as the “Ogden
Triangle” or the “Semiotic Triangle.”27 (See Figure 3). 28

FIGURE 3

(Source: Bosco, supra note 12.)
A. Bosco explains the working of the Ogden Triangle as a
function of the relationships between all three factors, represented
by the sides of the triangle. While referring to other works on the
Ogden triangle, he expounds that:
The relationship between the thought and symbol are causal,
meaning the symbol evokes an attitude or a proposed effect on
another person. Similarly, there is a relationship between the
thought and the referent, though the relationship can be either
direct, such as something we can see in front of us, or indirect, such

26. O GDEN & RICHARDS , supra note 11, at 11.
27. Givi Amaglobeli, Semantic Triangle and Linguistic Sign, 1 SCI . J.
HUMAN. 37 (2012)
28. Bosco, supra note 12.
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as an image or idea about something we have seen in another
instance. Finally, the relationship between the symbol and the
referent is purely indirect in that it is an arbitrary relationship
created by someone who wishes the symbol to represent the
referent. As demonstrated by the illustration above, the word “dog”
is associated in the mind of the reader as a particular animal. The
word is not the animal, but the association links the two, thus all
three elements are required in an irreducible triad for the signs to
operate correctly.
A unique and fascinating quality of Ogden and Richards’ theory is
that it implies meaning can be arbitrarily exchanged without the
need to understand how one another feels. What this means is that
so long as definitions are created that all parties agree to, feelings
regarding those definitions are inconsequential. In fact, according to
Ogden and Richards, “Whenever we hear anything said, we spring
spontaneously to an immediate conclusion, namely, that the speaker
is referring to what we should be referring to were we speaking the
words ourselves.29

If we prepare a similar triangular model between meaning,
law, and definition on lines of the semiotic triangle comprising of
thought, symbol, and referent, then we would discover, like
thought and symbol, that law and meaning enjoy a direct and
causal relationship (See FIGURE 4). Similar to thought and
referent, law and definition also enjoy a direct and causal
relationship. But like symbol and referent, meaning and definition
share an imputed connection. In the absence of respective
copulas30 of thought and law, the connection between symbolreferent and meaning-definition cannot exist.
FIGURE 4
Thought

CORRECT

Law

ADEQUATE

CORRECT

IMPUTED

Symbol

ADEQUATE

IMPUTED

Referent

Meaning

Definition

29. Id. (citations omitted).
30. See G RAMMAR.COM , Copula (copular verb)- In English grammar, a
copula is a verb that joins the subject of a sentence or clause to a subject
complement, http://grammar.about.com/od/c/g/copulaterm.htm (last visited on
Jan. 1, 2017).

1086

The John Marshall Law Review

[49:1077

As mentioned earlier, the relationship between the symbol
and the referent is purely indirect in that it is an arbitrary
relationship created by someone who wishes the symbol to
represent the referent. Law performs a similar function between
meaning and definition. Law selects one definition to the exclusion
of all other meanings. The journey from meaning to definition
cannot be covered in the absence of law. Law serves the dual
function of making sure that not only the appropriate meaning
gets selected as definition but that it also gets accepted. What
constitute ‘appropriate meaning’ depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case, and the social and political context in
which the case is adjudicated.
In the ensuing sections, I argue that in India, singular
meaning (individual rights) invariably suffer a semantical defeat
at the hands of plural meaning (public interest). But before that, it
is worth visiting the law’s ability to infuse meaning in otherwise
seemingly meaningless acts.

A. Infusion of Meaning: The Myth of Sisyphus
So far we have been exploring the relationship between
meaning and law with law acting as the selector, connector, and
arbitrator of meaning. I now wish to focus attention on law’s role
as creator of meaning. And in order to do so, we begin with the
myth of Sisyphus.
The gods had condemned Sisyphus to ceaselessly rolling a rock to
the top of a mountain, whence the stone would fall back of its own
weight. They had thought with some reason that there is no more
dreadful punishment than futile and hopeless labor. 31

Thus begins Camus’ absurdist inquisition into plight of
Sisyphus who was condemned by Gods to perform a meaningless
task in the underworld perennially. Camus is not interested in the
reasons for condemnation of Sisyphus- the accounts vary. 32 But
once his fate is sealed and Sisyphus has to perpetually push a rock
to the top of the mountain only for it to roll back down and toil
back again, Sisyphus becomes of interest to Camus. As per Camus,
at the point of return from the top of the mountain, while moving
down to once again collect the rock and push it back up, Sisyphus

31. ALBERT CAMUS , THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND O THER ESSAYS 119
(Justin O’Brien trans., 1991).
32. Literary accounts vary as to who Sisyphus was and his reasons for
condemnation. Some say he was the wisest of all, others say he was a
highwayman. Reasons for his condemnation vary from chaining death to
stealing secrets to eloping with the daughter of a God. See id. at 119.
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is conscious of his fate and is in fact “superior” to it in that “[h]e is
stronger than his rock.”33
In other words, Sisyphus’ suffering is not caused by the
meaningless and perennial nature of his ordeal but actually by his
consciousness. As per some philosophers, if the myth were to be
altered slightly, and it is assumed that all Sisyphus ever wanted to
do ever in his life was to roll a rock up a mountain repeatedly,
then the act would no longer constitute suffering. 34 The question
that is pertinent for our inquiry is: if Sisyphus is conscious of his
suffering, then why does he persist with the ordeal? One cannot
rely on the coercive power of law or the gods’ decree to answer this
question, as the coercive power has already been exercised, and
Sisyphus has already been condemned to the worst possible fate as
envisaged by Gods. One may then take recuse to the gods’ decree
to argue that Sisyphus doesn't have a choice but to comply.
However, this reasoning takes away from the consciousness that
Camus attributes to Sisyphus35.
Perhaps then, we can use this example to understand the
ability of law (or the gods’ decree in Sisyphus’ case) to infuse
meaning in a scenario that is otherwise devoid of meaning. If we
look at various mundane acts of our lives that constitute routine,
we will recognize law’s ability to infuse meaning in otherwise
seemingly meaningless events. For instance, the act of driving on a
particular side of road is inherently meaningless up until we
introduce it as a legal norm that has to be followed in order to
ensure safety. Suddenly, a random act gets elevated to a
meaningful one. The business hours of any commercial operation
may be a factor of economic forces but are enforced on account of
law. Law takes an otherwise arbitrary period of time and infuses
meaning in it - thus, balancing the commercial interests of the
entrepreneur with the rights of the laborers. If we examine closely,
our lives are fraught with countless examples of otherwise
seemingly random, arbitrary acts which create order because of
the meaning law infuses in them. From enforcing restrictions on
the entrance of vehicles in certain areas 36 to enforcing only
selective commitments as contracts, 37 law has a unique ability to
infuse meaning in otherwise seemingly random human conduct.

33. Id. at 121.
34. WOLF, supra note 7, at 17.
35. CAMUS , supra note 31, at 121.
36. For a fascinating interpretation of Hart’s “[n]o vehicles in the park”
reference from various perspectives see Fallon Jr., supra note 4, at 1255
(2015).
37. One of the important prerequisites of any contract, oral or written, is
the intention to give rise to legal relationship. See Bhawna Gulati, Intention to
Create Legal Relations’: A Contractual Necessity or an Illusory Concept, 2
BEIJING L. REV ., 127 (2011).
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IV. THE BATTLE BETWEEN SINGULARITY AND PLURALITY
So far we have examined the relationship between meaning
and law from the creation and selection perspectives. In this
section, I wish to analyze how construction of meaning affects
rights. While analyzing the modes of interpretation we usually pay
attention to context, legislative intent, and text but almost never
to the meaning underlying law. This is a tremendous fallacy as the
law’s ability to shape meaning is of enormous significance to the
language of rights. As stated earlier, human beings are inherently
meaning seeking beings. This human trait ensures that those
rights which are perceived as “more meaningful” triumph over
others that are perceived as less so. This perception is as much a
product of the country’s legal system as it is of the country’s socioeconomic and political conditions. But law with its innate ability to
regulate human conduct is the prime driver of the construction
and absorption of meaning.
In India, for example, courts have consistently found public
interest to be more meaningful than individual rights. 38 It is my
hypothesis that the Indian Judiciary has consistently interpreted
legal text in a manner where text capable of vague or pluralistic
meaning triumphs over concrete, singular meaning. This triumph

38. In Mardia Chemicals Limited v. Union of India (2004) 4 S.C.C. 311, the
Supreme Court while considering the validity of the SARFAESI Act and the
recovery of non-performing assets by banks and financial institutions in India,
held:
It may be observed that though the transaction may have a character of
a private contract yet the question of great importance behind such
transactions as a whole having far reaching effect on the economy of
the country cannot be ignored, purely restricting it to individual
transactions more particularly when financing is through banks and
financial institutions utilizing the money of the people in general
namely, the depositors in the banks and public money at the disposal of
the financial institutions. Therefore, wherever public interest to such a
large extent is involved and it may become necessary to achieve an
object which serves the public purposes, individual rights may have to
give way. Public interest has always been considered to be above the
private interest. Interest of an individual may, to some extent, be
affected but it cannot have the potential of taking over the public
interest having an impact in the socio-economic drive of the country.
Id. Again, in Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Kerala
and Ors (2013) 16 S.C.C. 82, the Supreme Court observed:
Right to information and Right to privacy are, therefore, not absolute
rights, both the rights, one of which falls under Article 19(1)(a) and the
other under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, can obviously be
regulated, restricted and curtailed in the larger public interest.
Absolute or uncontrolled individual rights do not and cannot exist in
any modern State.
Id.
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is neither to be interpreted in a numerical manner nor in a
sociological sense of the public interest prevailing over the private
interest, but in a semantical manner where Indian courts have
constantly favored vague general meaning over specific,
crystallized rights. This unique school of thought has resulted in
constant expansion of power of judicial review, often to the
detriment of individual rights.
My hypothesis is that supremacy of individual rights can be
maintained when it is an organic product of the society (like in the
United States) rather than when it is transplanted in the society
(like in India, where life traditionally has been understood more in
nature of Karma or duty). 39 In the latter society, while
transplanted individual rights may develop roots, their branches
(the expansion of rights) will always be clipped. As stated earlier,
the defeat of individual rights at the hand of public interest is not
a demographical defeat, but a semantical defeat. An individual
right with a singular defined meaning, which excludes all other
interpretation, would always lose to a multi-headed Hydra40-like
entity called public interest. Given the fluid nature of public
interest, it will always keep on changing its meaning to defeat
individual rights. In the ensuing paragraphs, I cite two specific
examples of cases that I had fought and lost on behalf of a
‘polluting’ industry and a private school, both of whose right to
freedom of business, trade, and commerce was defeated on account
of a varied and context-dependent interpretation of ‘public
interest’ to the detriment of private individual rights.
By citing these cases, I do not wish to state that public
interest is a meaningless concept. In my opinion, ‘public interest’ is
a concept that derives meaning from context. In every new case,
meaning is assigned to public interest depending upon the facts
and circumstances. Unlike individual rights, its pluralistic,
chameleon-like nature allows construction and deconstruction of
39. The Bhagwad Gita, one of the foremost sacred Hindu texts, enunciates
the concept of Karma when Lord Krishna addresses a disheartened Prince
Arjuna amidst a battlefield to perform his Karma by picking up his weapons
and fighting the righteous war against his family members.
But thou hast only the right to work, but none to the fruit thereof. Let
not then the fruit of thy action be thy motive; nor yet be thou enamored
of inaction. . . . All honour to him whose mind controls his senses, for he
is thereby beginning to practice Karma-Yoga, the Path of Right Action,
keeping himself always unattached.
THE
BHAGWAD
G ITA
6-13
(Shri
Purohit
Swami
trans.),
http://d23a3s5l1qjyz.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/BhagavadGita.pdf (last visited on Oct. 25, 2016).
40. The Lernaean Hydra was a monster in Greek mythology. It had many
heads and every time someone would cut off one of them, two more heads
would grow out of the stump. Lernaean Hydra, G REEK MYTHOLOGY
http://greekmythology.com/Myths/Monsters/Lernaean_Hydra/lernaean_hydra.
html (last visited on Jan. 4, 2017).
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meaning more readily. Also, unlike individual rights, a fluid
concept like public interest cannot be reasonably restricted.
The effect of adoption of one particular meaning to the
exclusion of all others is that the rejected meaning is lost forever,
unless revisited in another case. How does this adoption succeed?
Whether it is a contract or constitution, the meaning evolves from
consensus, or that there is meaning for the same thing in the same
sense. Law manufactures consensus through legitimacy41 and
coercion. 42 This consensus, whether real, perceived, artificial, or
manufactured, then becomes the bedrock of meaning. Rights, like
objects, are without meaning. It is law, which ascribes meaning to
them. And, in case of conflict between rights, the right with
pluralistic meaning is perceived to be more meaningful and
triumphs over the right with singular meaning.
In this section, I analyze some judicial precedents to support
my hypothesis that courts in India have consistently given
preference to pluralistic meaning over singular.

A. Exhibit A: The Doctrine of Basic Structure
Since its initiation, the feature of the Constitution of India,
which has been at the heart of the most contentious constitutional
litigation, is the legislature’s power to amend the constitution. 43
41. JOSEPH RAZ, AUTHORITY OF LAW 7 (2008)
42. FREDERICK SCAHUER, FORCE OF LAW 59 (2015)
43. Article 368 of the Constitution of India reads as:
368. Power of Parliament to amend the Constitutio n and procedure
therefor(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in
exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or
repeal any provision of this Constitution in accordance with the
procedure laid down in this article.
(2) An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the
introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and
when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of the total
membership of that House present and voting, it shall be presented to
the President who shall give his assent to the Bill and thereupon the
Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the
Bill:
Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in(a) Article 54, Article 55, Article 73, Article 162 or Article 241, or
(b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of Part XI,
or
(c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or
(d) the representation of States in Parliament, or
(e) the provisions of this article,
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From right to property cases involving Zamindari44 rights45 to
bank nationalization, 46 to abolition of privy purses47 to
appointment of judges, 48 the extent and contours of legislative
powers of the parliament has been the subject of immense judicial
scrutiny. At the heart of this debate lies the doctrine of separation
of powers, as interpreted in the Indian context. The Indian
constitutional journey has periodically witnessed ascendance of

the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislature of
not less than one half of the States by resolution to that effect passed
by those Legislatures before the Bill making provision for such
amendment is presented to the President for assent.
(3) Nothing in Article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under
this article
(4) No amendment of this Constitution (including the provisions of Part
III) made or purporting to have been made under this article whether
before or after the commencement of Section 55 of the Constitution
(Forty second Amendment) Act, 1976 shall be called in question in any
court on any ground
(5) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that there shall be
no limitation whatever on the constituent powe r of Parliament to
amend by way of addition, variation or repeal the provisions of this
Constitution under this article
INDIA CONST. art. 368 (footnotes omitted).
44. Barbara Pozzo, A Suitable Boy: The Abolition of Feudalism in India, 1
ERASMUS L. REV . 41 (2008) https://ssrn.com/abstract=1142845. The zamindari
system originated in India during Mughal domination. A zamindar in Mughal
times was a ‘vassal in chief’ and zamindari was defined as ‘the right which
belonged to a rural class other than, and standing above, the peasantry’. The
purpose of zamindari was of course to provide possessors with an income. This
could derive from the land’s products, as well as from holding back a share of
the annual harvest, but also from other sources, such as the sale o f milk. In
this situation, agricultural production was not at all left intact in the hands of
the peasants: it was creamed off by the land tax, with the government, central
or provincial, taking the major share. The rest went to local landholders, with
a small residue allotted to the villages collectively and from which corporate
village life and its services were maintained. The actual cultivator was left
with just enough to subsist on and with no reserve against famine.
The system continued under the British rule of India and was finally
abolished after independence of India by the various State Zamindari
Abolition Acts which were sought to be protected by amending the
Constitution vide the First Constitutional Amendment. This Amendment was
held to be constitutionally valid by the Supreme Court in Shankari Prasad v.
Union of India, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 458 (India).
45. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 458 (India). See
also Namita Wahi, State, Private Property and the Supreme Court, FRONTLINE
(Sept. 22-Oct. 5, 2012), www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2919/stories/2012
1005291903600.htm.
46. Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 564 (India).
47. H. H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1971 S.C.
530 (India).
48. Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association and Ors. v. Union of
India, (2015) 11 S.C.A.L.E. 1 (India).
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the legislature over the judiciary, followed by systemic reversal.
India’s Constitution has been privy to a restrained judiciary, 49 a
compliant judiciary, 50 and finally, to an activist judiciary asserting
its constitutional existence in ways that have been seen as
impinging upon the legislative powers of the parliament. 51

49. In Shankari Prasad, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 458, the constitutional validity of
first constitutional amendment, which curtailed the right to property, w as
challenged. The Supreme Court upheld the legislature’s authority to amend
fundamental rights, which allowed for the eventual abolition of Zamindari.
See id; see also Case Analysis : Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, LAWLEX
(May 17, 2014), http://lawlex.org/lex-bulletin/case-analysis-shankari-prasadvs-union-of-india-air-1951-sc-455/9758. The Supreme Court ruled that the
power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 also included the power to
amend fundamental rights, and that the word “law” in Article 13(2) includes
only an ordinary law made in exercise of the legislative powers, and does not
include a constitutional amendment which is made in exercise of constituent
power. Shankari Prasad, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 458. Therefore, a Constitutional
amendment will be valid even if it abridges or takes away any of the
fundamental rights. Id.
50. The worst hour for democracy in India coincided with Indian judiciary’s
worst hour. India’s noted jurist and former Solicitor General T. R.
Andhyarujina vividly recounts Supersession of Judges and the Supreme
Court’s verdict in ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207
(India), which upheld the detention of opposition leaders and suspension of
fundamental rights during emergency, in his article, When the Bench Buckled.
T.R. Andhyarujina, When the Bench Buckled, INDIAN EXPRESS (July 8, 2015),
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/when-the-bench-buckled/; See
also Jos. Peter D 'Souza, A.D.M. Jabalpur vs Shukla, When the Supreme Court
Struck Down the Habeas Corpus, PEOPLE ’S UNION CIV . LIBERTIES (June 2001),
www.pucl.org/reports/National/2001/habeascorpus.h tm.
51. “[T]he Supreme Court of India has attracted wide attention,
particularly for its enforcement of affirmative action, social welfare, and
environmental provisions in the Indian Constitution.” Peter E. Quint, “The
Most Extraordinarily Powerful Court of Law the World has ever Known?”Judicial Review in the United States and Germany, 65 MD. L. REV . 152 (2006).
See also Charles R. Epp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 72 (1998) (citing Rajeev
Dhavan, JUSTICE ON TRIAL (1980) and Carl Baar, Social Action Litigation in
India: The Operation and Limits of the World's Most Active Judiciary , in
COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY (Donald W. Jackson & C.
Neal Tate eds., 1992)); Ramachandran Raju, Judicial Supremacy and the
Collegium,
SEMINAR
(2013)
http://india-seminar.com/2013/642/642_raju_
ramachandran.htm (“The Indian judiciary is one of the most powerful in the
world. Judicial supremacy has become a fact of our constitutional life, at least
from 1973, when the Supreme Court held by a slender and doubtful majority
in the Kesavananda Bharati case that amendments to the Constitution would
be struck down if they violated the basic structure of the Constitution. Any
talk of such supremacy is quickly dismissed with the cliché that it is the
Constitution which is supreme. This is countered with another oft-repeated
saying, namely that the Constitution is what the judges say it is. . . . A
weakened political class has over the last four decades meekly surrendered to
judicial supremacy. It is this larger surrender that explains the acquiescence
to lesser forms of judicial activism in Public Interest Litigation. It has often
found it convenient to do so because it is easy then to avoid decision making,
leaving it to the courts to decide.”).
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At the heart of this battle between the legislature and
judiciary is the most important constitutional doctrine of Indian
legal jurisprudence, that of the basic structure of the constitution.52
The doctrine of basic structure essentially states that the
Parliament can amend the constitution to any extent as long as it
does not destroy the basic structure of the constitution.53 The
beauty of the doctrine is that what constitutes basic structure has
never been fully defined, but has been left to the wisdom of courts
to be expounded on a case-by-case basis. 54 The basic structure
52. The reading of basic structure doctrine is a lesson in Indian
Constitutional legal history. A worthy attempt to recapitulate this history has
been made by Aqa Raza, The “Basic Structure” Doctrine in the Indian
Constitution:
A
Juridical
Critique
(Sept.
23,
2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2661127. Without straying from my chief topic, I only
wish to highlight that the basic structure doctrine is the inevitable democratic
evolution of restraint on the constituent amending power of the legislature. In
some countries, this restraint may arise out of political wisdom; in India it is a
result of judicial review. The doctrine of basic structure was devised by the
Supreme Court of India in the case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala
(1973) 4 S.C.C. 255. But, the discord between the judiciary and the legislature
was long brewing over the latter’s power to amend the Constitution and its
impact on fundamental rights. The early rounds of the duel in Shankari
Prasad, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 458, and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan A.I.R.
1965 S.C. 845 went in favor of the legislature as the first and seventeenth
constitutional amendments, respectively were upheld by the Supreme Court.
However, the seventeenth constitutional amendment once again came up for
challenge before the Supreme Court in I.C. Golaknath & Ors. V. State of
Punjab & Anrs., A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643, and this time the court overruled the
previous judgment and held that the parliament does not have the power to
take away fundamental rights under an amendment to Part III of India’s
Constitution. The Court held that Art. 368 merely describes the procedure of
amendment and the actual power of amendment comes from Arts. 245, 246,
248 and Entry 97 of List I. Id. “Amendment” is a “Law” within Art. 13(2). Id.
In order to overcome the Supreme Court’s decision in Golaknath, parliament
added Art. 13(4) by the twenty-fourth constitutional amendment, which said
that Art. 13 will not apply to any amendments made under Art. 368. INDIA
CONST. art. 1, § 4. This was challenged before the Supreme Court in
Kesavananda Bharati, (1973) 4 S.C.C. 255. The court overruled Golaknath but
went on to hold that the parliament has wide, but not unlimited, power of
amending the constitution. Id. The usage of the word “amendment” in the
constitution means that the basic framework of the constitution must survive
after the amendment. See id. An amendment does not allow for destruction of
the basic structure of the constitution. Id; see also L.M. SINGHVI ,
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 3899-3900 (2013).
53. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) 3 S.C.C. 625, Supreme
Court Advocates on Record Association and Ors. v. Union of India, (2015) 11
S.C.A.L.E. 1 (India).
54. Raju, supra note 51. The Kesavananda Bharati case did not lay down
the specific and particular features mentioned in that judgment alone would
constitute the basic structure of the Constitution. Kesavananda Bharati,
(1973) 4 S.C.C. 255. In a later opinion, the Court noted that “in the judgments
of Shelat & Grover, JJ., Hegde & Mukherjee, JJ. and Jaganmohan Reddy, J.,
there are specific observations to the effect that their list of essential features
comprising the basic structure of the Constitution are illustrative and are not
intended to be exhaustive.” L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 2
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doctrine is deliberately left vague, so as to expand it, as and when
necessary, and thus gives primacy to the judiciary in any
constitutional conflict. 55 Subsequently, on a case-by-case basis, the
doctrine of basic structure has been expounded with later
insertions, including democracy, 56 power of judicial review, 57 rule
of law, 58 effective access to justice, 59 free, fair and periodic
elections, 60 federalism, 61 secularism, 62 separation of powers
between the legislature, executive, and judiciary, and the
independence of judiciary. 63
The doctrine of basic structure is the ultimate homage to the
triumph of plurality over singularity of meaning. By retaining the
doctrine in a fluid form, the Indian courts have ensured that
interpretation of all individual rights and legislative powers will
perpetually be deferential to public interest and judicial review,
respectively. It is a testament to the doctrine’s semantical
supremacy that all cases decided under its purview have either
resulted in expansion of sphere of public interest or judicial
supremacy, or both.

B. Exhibit B: M/s. DRG Grate Udyog v. State of
Madhya Pradesh64
The DRG case involved an interesting conflict between an
individual and public right. I represented the petitioner, a stone
crusher unit, before the National Green Tribunal (“Tribunal”). The
case involved operational rights of a stone crusher unit. The law in
the State of Madhya Pradesh provided that any stone crusher has
to be set up at a minimum distance of 500 meters from a
residential area. The stone crusher unit in question was set up at
a distance of 600 meters from the closest residential area but was
at a distance of 450 meters from a school. The Madhya Pradesh
S.C.R. 1186.
55. Some of the illustrations given by Sikri, C.J. while explaining the
concept of basic structure in Kesavananda Bharati case were (i) supremacy of
the Constitution, (ii) republican and democratic form of government, (iii)
secular character of the Constitution, (iv) separation of powers between the
legislature, the executive and the judiciary, and (v) federal character of the
Constitution. See V.N. Shukla, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1003 (2002).
56. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain & Anr, (1976) 2 S.C.R. 347.
57. S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 S.C.C. 124.
58. Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 S.C.C. 362.
59. Central Coal Fields Ltd. v. Jaiswal Coal Co., A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 2125.
60. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachilhu, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 412.
61. S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918.
62. Id.
63. State of Bihar & Anr. v. Bal Mukund Sah and Ors., 4 S.C.C. 640;
Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association and Ors. v. Union of India,
(2015) 11 S.C.A.L.E. 1.
64. Application No. 96 of 2012 (May 9, 2013) (National Green Tribunal,
India).
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Pollution Control guidelines did not define residential area. Our
contention, which was rejected by the court, was that the term
residential area, as literally understood and as defined by
pollution control norms of other states, does not include a school
and, as such, any ambiguity in the definition of residential area
should be interpreted in favor of the Petitioner, who should not be
penalized for lack of definition, especially when it has obtained all
other relevant approvals. The Tribunal, while rejecting the
Petitioner’s claim, propounded an expansive definition of the term
‘residential area’ to include a habitat. There are various ways of
understanding the court’s decision:
i.
ii.
iii.

In the absence of a statutory definition, the court
adopted a purposive interpretation. 65
The court interpreted the term ‘residential area’ in a
manner to further the legislative intent. 66
The court interpreted the term ‘residential area’ in a
socioeconomic context so as to protect the health
rights of school children. 67

I, however, wish to propound a different proposition. Here
was a case of conflict between individual right and public interest;
here was a case involving semantical challenge between public
interest, which is inherently capable of plural meaning, and
65. When the material words are capable of bearing two or more
constructions the most firmly established rule of construction is the rule laid
down in Heydon’s Case, (1584) 3 Co. Rep 7, also known as purposive
construction. The rule requires consideration of four matters in construing an
Act: i.) the law prior to the act; ii.) “the mischief or defect” which was not
accounted for under the law prior to the act; iii.) the remedy provided under
the act; and iv.) the reason for the remedy. Id. Purposive construction also
means that judges cannot interpret statutes in light of their views as to policy;
but they can adopt a purposive interpretation if found in the statute when
read as a whole or in the material to which they are permitted by law to refer
to as aids to interpretation as an expression of Parliament’s purpose or policy.
See G.P. Singh, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, 20, 124 (2012);
Shah v. Barnet London Borough Council, (1983) 1 All ER 226 (Eng). On
purposivisim, see Fallon, supra note 4, at 1286.
66. On legislative intent, see Singh, supra note 65, at 3. See also Vishnu
Pratap Sagar Works (Private) Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Stamp, U.P., A.I.R.
1968 S.C. 102 (“[a] statute is “an edict of the Legislature” and the conventional
way of interpreting or construing a statute is to seek the intention of the
maker”); RMD Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 628 (a
statute is to be constructed according “to the intent of them that make it.”). On
legislative intentionalism, see Fallon, supra note 4, at 1286.
67. On contextual interpretation, see Singh, supra note 65, at 15-16. See
also Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage , 218 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1914)
(“[statutes] should not be construed as theorems of Euclid, but with some
imagination of the purposes which lie behind them.); Poppatlal Shah v. State
of Madras, A.I.R. 1953 SC 274 (“[e]ach word, phrase or sentence is to be
construed in light of the general purpose of the Act itself.”); Kanta Goel v. B.D.
Pathak, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1599 (the interpretive effort “must be illumined by
the goal, though guided by the word.”).

1096

The John Marshall Law Review

[49:1077

singular
interpretation
of
individual
commercial
rights.
Regardless of the mode of interpretation adopted by the court, the
verdict resulted in triumph of plurality of meaning over
singularity. In the absence of a prescribed meaning of the term
residential area, the court using law as a copula defined the term
residential area in a broad, vague and pluralistic manner so as to
triumph over the singular and concrete right of business of the
stone crusher unit.

C. Exhibit C: The “Right to Education” Case 68
Society for Un-aided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of
India (“Right to Education”) involved a challenge to the provisions
of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act
(“Act”69), which directed all government and private schools to
reserve twenty five percent of their seats for children from
economically weaker sections of the society. The provisions of the
Act were challenged as violative of the constitutionally guaranteed
autonomy of the schools. I represented one of the private schools.
Our argument was against the flawed conception and execution of
the right to education as envisaged by the Act. 70 Apart from the
economic constraints imposed by the Act on the private schools,
the Act also impinged upon the right of private schools to manage
their own affairs and impart education as per their vision. This
necessarily included freedom to select one’s own students and the
ability to promote students to next grade on merit rather than as a
matter of right. The Supreme Court while upholding the children’s
right to education dismissed the challenge mounted by the private
schools. The Court in its wisdom, however, deemed it fit to create
an exception for minority unaided schools and said that the
provisions of the Act would not apply to such schools. 71
The Court upheld the prevailing judicial wisdom that
education in India is a charitable activity, which is subject to
reasonable restrictions. The children’s right to education
triumphed over the administrative and commercial rights of
private schools except for minority unaided schools which were
68. Society for Un-aided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India &
Ors, (2012) 6 S.C.C. 1.
69. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009,
No. 35 of 2009, India Code (2016). The Act provides for free and compulsory
education for children between the ages of six and fourteen in accordance with
Art.21A of the Constitution of India.
70. Society for Un-aided Private Schools of Rajasthan, (2012) 6 S.C.C. 1.
(See the petition of Joy Education Society, W.P. No.148 of 2011).
71. Society for Un-aided Private Schools of Rajasthan, (2012) 6 S.C.C. 1. I
find it extremely interesting that while ruling against us the then Chief
Justice Kapadia opened his judgment with the following quote, ‘To say that "a
thing is constitutional is not to say that it is desirable"’ Id., (quoting Dennis v.
United States (1950) 341 US 494).
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exempted on account of specific constitutional provisions
guaranteeing an absolute autonomy which was not subject to
reasonable restriction. 72 The court’s ruling perhaps envisages a
vague but possibly a bright future for the children ensured
through right to education. No matter how ill-conceptualized the
right was in terms of putting the burden on private schools to
provide free education to children, it triumphed over concrete
constitutional and commercial concerns of private schools. In other
words, a vague, pluralistic interpretation of public interest once
again triumphed over concrete, singularity of meaning assigned to
individual rights.
It is worth interrogating, albeit briefly as any such
interrogation would only be in the realm of speculation, the
reasons for the triumph of the pluralistic interpretation of public
interest over singularity of individual rights. Why does the Indian
judiciary consider public interest to be more meaningful than
individual rights? One reason could be found, as mentioned
earlier, in the traditional Karmic view ascribed to life in India
giving ascendance to duty over right. Yet another reason could be
the socialistic tendencies that are writ large in the constitution of
India. 73 Lastly, it can be argued that a certain degree of vagueness
in interpretation is not only desirable but also necessary for
democratic evolution of rights. This will ensure that the
interpretation of rights does not result in intangible losses as
opposed to tangible gains.
The key finding that emerges from the aforesaid legal
discourse is that depending upon the nature of right involved,
law’s ability to produce meaning changes from singular to plural.
This finding is of vast import for expanding the horizon of
individual rights. In order to expand the purview of individual
rights, we need to devise tools of interpretation that can overcome
the law’s default restriction on infusing plural meaning in
individual rights. However, before I suggest scenarios wherein
individual rights can triumph over public interest in a semantical

72. INDIA CONST. art. 30 provides:
30. Right of minorities to establish and administer educational
institutions:
(1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the
right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice .
Id.
73. The 42nd constitutional amendment added the word socialist to the
preamble of the Constitution of India. The addition of the word socialist
enabled the courts to lean more in favor of nationalization. See Excel Wear v.
Union of India, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 25. Even before that various directive
principles of state policy prescribed socialistic goals for the nation. The
Supreme Court of India has consistently upheld the importance of preamble in
interpreting the Constitution. See Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India,
(2008) 6 SCC 1.
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conflict, it is important to understand the impact of the existing
interpretations on the identity of an individual.

D. Meaning and Identity
So far, we have been examining instances where individual
rights have been sacrificed at the altar of public interest or put
differently pluralistic interpretation has triumphed over singular.
I now wish to briefly examine the impact of these interpretations
and the relationship between meaning and identity. What is the
impact of the triumph of the pluralistic interpretation of public
interest over singular meaning assigned to individual rights on the
identity of an individual? The understanding of the co-relation
between meaning and identity is important because in a rights
based society existence and identification is a factor of
interpretation of rights which derive their meaning from law. In
my opinion, narrowing down the sphere of individual rights results
in creation of monolithic subservient identity. For instance, the
restriction on the number of hours that a woman can work in a
factory may result in her identifying herself more as a homemaker
than an industrial worker. The battle between individual rights
and public interest can be best understood as a semantical battle
between singularity and plurality. Once a fixed meaning is
assigned to an individual right it becomes subservient to an
amoebic concept like public interest on account of exclusion of all
other meanings. Indian law has traditionally placed reasonable
restrictions on all individual rights. 74 Indian Courts have

74. See, e.g., INDIA CONST. art. 19:
19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech etc
(1) All citizens shall have the right
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and
(f) omitted
(g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or
business
(2) Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause ( 1 ) shall affect the operation of
any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as
such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
conferred by the said sub clause in the interests of the sovereignty and
integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with
foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to
contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence
(3) Nothing in sub clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation
of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from
making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and
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complimented this by expanding only those individual rights,
which have a public nature for instance right to environment,75
right to education76 and right to health77 have received far more
expansive interpretation as opposed to strictly individual rights
such as freedom of speech and expression 78 and right to carry on
integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise
of the right conferred by the said sub clause
(4) Nothing in sub clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation
of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from
making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and
integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on
the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause
(5) Nothing in sub clauses (d) and (e) of the said clause shall affect the
operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the
State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the
exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub clauses either in
the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests
of any Scheduled Tribe
(6) Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation
of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from
making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public,
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said
sub clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub clause shall affect
the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the
State from making any law relating to,
(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing
any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled
by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the
exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise”
Id.
75. Right to Life under INDIA CONST. art. 21 includes the right to an
unpolluted environment and envisages protection of wild life, forests, lakes
and protection from noise, air, and water pollution. Indian Council for Enviro
Legal Action v. Union of India, (1996) 3 S.C.C. 212, 281; M.C. Mehta v. Union
of India, (1996) 8 S.C.C. 462.
76. Right to education is enforceable even against private schools. Society
for Un-aided Private Schools of Rajasthan, (2012) 6 S.C.C. 1.
77. Right to Life under INDIA CONST. art. 21 includes right to health and
medical aid to protect the health and vigour of a worker while in service or
after retirement. Consumer Education and Research Centre v. Union of India,
(1995) 3 S.C.C. 42.
78. In Devidas Ramachandra Tuljapurkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2015)
6 S.C.C. 1, the Supreme Court while dealing with charges of obscenity against
a poet for an allegedly offensive poem on Gandhi observed:
Freedom of speech and expression has to be given a broad canvas, but it
has to have inherent limitations which are permissible within the
constitutional parameters. We have already opined that freedom of
speech and expression as enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution is not absolute in view of Article 19(2) of the Constitution.
We reiterate the said right is a right of great value and transcends and
with the passage of time and growth of culture, it has to pave the path
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business trade and commerce. 79 Every time a vague pluralistic
interpretation of public interest triumphs over concrete singularity
of meaning assigned to individual rights, we treat human beings
as means to an end and not an end in themselves. Every time
pluralistic public interest triumphs over singular individual
interest, it is a victory of citizen over human. In order to establish
that singularity of interpretation is not an inevitable consequence
of individual rights, we need to establish the origin of rights
beyond the realm of individual and trace the moral authority of
law beyond individual rights- in human dignity. 80

V. CONCLUSION
In a both legal and existential sense, the trap of meaning is
perhaps unavoidable. There is a vast distinction between existing
without meaning and having a meaningless existence; the former
signifies an escape from the trappings of meaning and the latter a
loss of it. But if meaning is inevitable, our efforts are best served
by modulating its contours, particularly in the legal arena, to

of ascendancy, but it cannot be put in the compartment of absoluteness.
There is constitutional limitation attached to it.
Id.
79. The issue of reasonable restriction on trade can be best understood
with India’s repeated enactments of alcohol prohibition laws. The Supreme
Court has consistently curtailed the commercial right to sell liquor on account
of ‘public interest.’ In Krishan Kumar Narula v. State of Jammu and Kashmir,
A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1368 the Supreme Court observed that dealing in liquor is
business and a citizen has a right to do business in that commodity, but the
State can make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the said right, in
public interest. More recently in The Kerala Bar Hotels Association and Ors.
v. State of Kerala and Ors., 2016 (1) S.C.A.L.E. 70, the Supreme Court upheld
the ban on sale of alcohol in State of Kerala in all hotels except five star
hotels.
80. Perhaps the most poignant example of this form of interpretation came
from the German Constitutional Court, which in its judgment of 15th
February 2006 struck down Aviation Security Act 2005 that expressly
authorized the federal government to shoot down hijacked passenger
airplanes, in case they were likely to be crashed against a target on the
ground. The court while striking down the law as violative of human dignity
observed:
The state may not protect a majority of its citizens by intentionally
killing a minority – in this case, the crew and the passengers of a plane.
A weighing up of lives against lives according to the standard of how
many people are possibly affected on the one side and how many on the
other side is impermissible. The state may not kill people because they
are fewer in number than the ones whom the state hopes to save by
their being killed.
Id. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb.
15, 2006, Judgment of the First Senate of 15 February 2006, 1 BvR 357/05, ¶
1-156.
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further the cause of individual rights. For far too long, meaning
has existed as an albatross around the neck of individual rights
stifling their growth. In my conclusion, I envisage the following
scenarios where singularity of meaning of individual rights can
triumph over plurality of meaning of the public interest and
individual rights can emerge more meaningful:
1.

2.

3.

4.

One, extreme but idealistic way for the triumph of
individual rights would be placing them higher in the
judicial hierarchy of interpretation over the public
interest.
Second, way could be through time when individual
rights acquire a collective attribute, for example
legalization of same sex marriage in USA or
decriminalization of homosexuality in India, on
account of being an idea whose time has come. 81
Third, by adopting a new theory of interpretation
where clear crystallized rights shall be given
precedence over concepts, which cannot be defined.
Fourth, supremacy acquired through legitimacy. What
makes one meaning more legitimate than others is if
the said meaning is result of the inherent
characteristics of the subject matter. In-formation of
meaning would always be superior to ex-formation.
This would require increase in social depth and
expansion of individual rights, a course that would, as
much be a product of socio-political and economic
forces as it would be of legal interpretation.

Until any of the aforesaid approaches are conclusively
adopted, the battle between singularity and plurality of meaning
will continue unabated.

81. The Delhi High Court had in a landmark decision decriminalized
homosexuality. See Naz Foundation v. Government of Nct Of Delhi and
Others, 2010 Crim.L.J. (H.C.) 94 (July 2, 2009). This decision was
unfortunately reversed by the Supreme Court of India in Suresh Kumar
Koushal v. NAZ Foundation, A.I.R. 2014 S.C. 563. A review petition filed
against the said decision was dismissed and now a judicial remedy of last
resort- a curative petition is presently pending. See Vishnupriya Bhandaram,
Rainbow at the End of the Tunnel? Curative Petition on Section 377, a Last
Legal Remedy to Toss Draconian Law Out, FIRSTPOST INDIA, Feb. 1, 2016,
www.firstpost.com/india/rainbow-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel-curative-petitionon-section-377-a-last-legal-remedy-to-toss-draconian-law-out-2605384.h tml.
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